The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Court ruled against limits on the aggregate amount an individual can give to candidates and political party committees, brings with it an onslaught of complaints about the outlook of campaign finance regulations in the United States; however, the case represents only a minor alteration to the current campaign finance regulations. In light of the ruling in Citizens United, McCutcheon will not lead to a flood of money into campaigns, nor will it lead to an increase of corruption. The ruling may actually encourage more transparency in campaigns.

In 2010, longtime supporters of campaign finance reform in the United States were distraught by the outcome of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of removing restrictions on campaign advertising by corporations, unions and associations in the days leading up to an election. This decision marked the biggest reversal in campaign finance reform since the post-Watergate establishment of the Federal Elections Commission and its associated regulations. It was not the first time the Supreme Court rolled back reforms targeting corruption and the appearance of corruption between major financiers of campaigns and their beneficiaries, ambitious politicians.

The first major Supreme Court challenge to finance reform was in the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo, which followed the passage of a series of amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act. The F.E.C.A. was enacted in the early ‘70s and was amended after the Watergate scandal. The Buckley case ended favorably for proponents of campaign finance regulations, although it deemed expenditure limits for campaigns and limits on personal financing of campaigns unconstitutional. The most important aspect of the case was setting the precedent that campaign expenditures are a form of constitutionally protected free speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This principle would be used to the detriment of finance reform in the recent cases of Citizens United and McCutcheon.

The ruling in Citizens United generated incredible controversy. The case centered around whether or not Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, could place a documentary that characterized Hillary Clinton as unfit for the presidency on television within 30 days of a primary election. The court ruled in favor of Citizens United under the principle that electioneering is (a form of) free speech, even if from a corporation or union, thereby permitting corporate and union expenditure on campaign material in the period directly preceding elections.

If Citizens United set the stage for an end to the Watergate era campaign finance reform, McCutcheon stands as a mere affirmation of the ruling set in Citizens United. The ruling in McCutcheon ends aggregate limits on donations to official campaign organizations. This means individuals are still limited in the amount of money they can give to a candidate, but an individual can give to as many candidates as he or she desires. In light of Citizens United, the net effect on the amount of money in politics is most probably neutral.

For champions of transparency and accountability, McCutcheon may be a blessing in disguise. Many campaign opposition teams and major transparency organizations rely on campaign finance disclosure to locate conflicts of interests and potential evidence of corruption. After Citizens United, a significant portion of indirect campaign financing now passes through Super PACs and affiliated “social welfare” organizations. Some of this money can be donated anonymously. In turn, it became challenging for people to carry out one of the initial intentions of campaign finance reform: identifying corruption or the appearance of corruption. This loophole still stands. People can anonymously donate to super PACs; however, under McCutcheon, people are enabled to give much more money in the public realm and are therefore subjected to the types of scrutiny which campaign finance reform set out to achieve.

This is not to say individuals who support finance reform should not be upset with the McCutcheon ruling, only that there is a bright side to the ruling. Tougher questions remain about whether reformers should seek to close the loophole permitting anonymous donations to Super PAC affiliates, to overturn the Citizens United ruling or the development of an entirely new set of regulations for financing campaigns. For now, the U.S. electorate must prepare for even bigger campaigns with even more spending. If Hillary Clinton ends up running against Jeb Bush, the contemporary political dynasties of the United States will have no problem surpassing the 2 billion USD raised in the last presidential election cycle.

The fear that Breyer expounds after the ruling — that a donor could funnel money to a candidate through a multitude of official committees and other groups — is not unfounded, but the fear is moot in light of the astonishing amount of money passing through unofficial campaigns, PACs and other groups. Since so much money is spent on electioneering these days, it does not have to go through an official campaign in order to lead to corruption. Breyer and other justices in the minority are concerned that legislative votes can be bought, but this could happen even in situations where no money passed through official campaigns.

The rulings in Citizens United and Buckley, as well as the reforms in the Federal Elections Campaign Act, have no impact on the likelihood of a legislator voting one way or another in order to gain the support of a powerful business, association or union. Nor do these rulings affect the legitimacy of U.S. democracy. Voters still have independence in deciding which information to trust, ads to believe and flyers to consume. Restrictions on the availability of this information, by tying reform to money, are too often sought in order to benefit one political ideology over another rather than to target corruption. Campaign reformers should focus on elimination of anonymity in donors rather than limits on donations if they are truly concerned about combating corruption.