If you thought pettiness and infighting ended in high school, you were wrong. At the helm of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sits the Big 5, an elite clique characterized by internal bickering and power plays. Its members rush to throw out decisions that would require them to be held responsible for the various bloodied pages they have lent to history.

The veto was established in Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter, which stated that all substantive decisions of the Council must be made with “the concurring votes of the permanent members.” These permanent members, the Big 5, or P5 are the U.S., U.K., Russia, China, and France. The trademark characteristic of this membership is blatant disproportionality, with the Middle East, Latin America and Africa being severely underrepresented. The Big 5 is prone to internal disagreements as well: if the veto sequence is to be considered, the members have arranged themselves in a West vs the Rest formation. What is ironic is that the U.S. campaigned for China’s admission into the circle — remnants of post-WWII alliances.

The establishment of the veto means that, while at least 9 members (permanent or non- permanent) must approve tabling any decision or resolution on a substantive matter, it can be completely rejected if it draws the opposing vote of even a single P5 member. Crises in Israel, Myanmar, and Syria — humanitarian disasters of genocidal proportions — are largely dismissed since decisions tabled at the UNSC are legally binding, unlike those from the General Assembly. The veto serves as the P5’s elixir of unaccountability. Draft resolutions on these matters are tossed out with a flourish, saving both them and their allies from any ramifications.

Take a draft resolution that Russia vetoed in 2014, which declared the Russian annexation of Crimea invalid because it encroached upon the sovereignty of Ukraine. It went on to become yet another one of more than a hundred UNSC documents that have perished at the hands of Russia’s veto (the most by any permanent member). The U.S. is also culpable — it vetoed the resolution that would have called for Israeli evacuation of Palestinian territories, in light of its alliance with Israel and embassy establishment in occupied Jerusalem.

A trip down memory lane is illuminated by yet more vetoes serving self-interests. Resolutions on Syria which would have slapped sanctions, called for chemical weapons investigations, and extended humanitarian aid have been subject to both Russian and Chinese vetoes. Russia, in its open friendship with the Bashar Al Assad regime, believes that state authorities should be responsible for distributing aid, though the government’s credibility in this regard has been abysmal. One can argue that this was also China’s way of placating Al Assad for its future investments in the region as well as for his cooperation on its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, which would have cemented its importance in the Middle East.

Two schools of thought exist here: some say the veto gives the P5 more power than it should have, while others think that the veto is crucial to maintaining world peace and that those who use it will face international criticism if they do not use it judiciously. But the world today is vastly different from the one recovering from world wars, which was when the UN was formed. At the time, permanent membership was doled out to the victors of World War II. Would it still be right to cling onto the hierarchies created seventy-five years ago?

International scrutiny is drawn to the veto like a magnet, being one of the most frequently addressed procedures in the Council. Several nations have campaigned against it, asking the P5 to voluntarily restrain the veto in events of atrocity, but the future of this argument remains dubious. France has advocated a restrain on the veto while the G4 nations (Germany, India, Japan and Brazil) have campaigned hard to be granted access to the privilege. It should be noted that the UK and France have not used the veto since 1989.

The UN cannot expect to reach a complete abolishment of the veto since it requires the approval of the P5 nations. After all, once you have consorted with power, is it all that easy to stop?

Almost 300 vetoes have been used till now. Hundreds of resolutions — and more that were never introduced for fear of a veto — both lived and died in the UNSC meeting rooms when many could have brought about actual change. The United Nations proudly talks about their faith in the equal rights of nations, both “large and small” in its charter’s preamble. The question ultimately arises: How does the veto serve this imperative clause when it reinforces a culture in which five nations do not have to worry about being called out, even when people are dying?