The term “continental philosophy” is usually attributed to 20th century writings, but can also be traced back to the works of John Stuart Mill in the first half of the 19th century. Several attempts have been made to clearly define analytic and continental philosophy and draw distinctions between the two fields, some more successful or commonly accepted than others.

Some analytic philosophers claim that their arguments are superior to those of continental philosophers; “... most of us [i.e., analytic philosophers] write better than most of them [i.e., continental philosophers],” wrote analytic philosopher Jerry Fodor. Meanwhile, many continental philosophers are opposed to analytic philosophers’ preoccupation with logic and the “dry” nature of their writing. In the worst cases, the divide between analytic and continental philosophy leads to one camp thinking the work of the other is not “real philosophy.”

However, there seems to be more to this alleged distinction beyond methodology and writing style. Sometimes, differences in subject matter are used to separate the two fields.

“A lot of the questions in analytic philosophy are questions about how the world is, rather than how people are or how society is,” said Gabriel Rabin, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at NYU Abu Dhabi. “One could think of it as the lens of continental philosophy being turned to people and society, while the lens of analytic philosophy is focused on the world itself,” he elaborated. This particular status given to analytical philosophy seems to liken it to a science, while associating continental philosophy more strongly with the humanities.

Matthew Silverstein, Associate Professor of Philosophy at NYUAD, expressed that distinctions between the two fields are present, but usually not precisely defined or fully defensible. “I think a lot of people have a very vague, general sense that there are two schools or methods or ways of doing philosophy. Sometimes, people who have this sense have an ‘I know it when I see it’ kind of reaction,” he stated.

Silverstein argued that some philosophers who would be considered continental, such as Nietzsche, have a very clear writing style reminiscent of the style traditionally associated with analytic philosophy. Therefore, writing style does not always provide a clear criterion based on which one can differentiate between the two putative fields. While some philosophers’ writings are easier to define than others, the answer to whether or not there exists a clear-cut distinction between the two putative fields would be “yes and no.”

What about the effect of the analytic versus continental debate on contemporary academia?

“In modern, mostly western universities in which philosophy is studied as a discipline, those departments are certainly dominated by analytic philosophy,” said Rabin. “A lot of what goes under the banner of continental philosophy is sometimes done by people who are employed in a different department, such as literature, politics or gender studies.”

Therefore, work in what would typically be defined as continental philosophy often takes place under titles besides philosophy. Silverstein presented a similar interpretation of the situation, while stating that it is not in itself problematic that some departments specialize in analytic philosophy.

“I am not sure there are dangers in individual programs having the identity of one or the other, but I do think it would be a shame if the broader discipline… couldn’t embrace a notion of philosophy which is sufficiently capacious to include work that goes on in both of these traditions,” argued Silverstein.

The current distinction between analytic and continental philosophy takes the shape of an ideological or methodological divide. However, this distinction is perceived by some to be too vague or unclear. While neither term is objectively negative or degrading, the proponents of one field can use the term describing the other for their own benefit. British philosopher Michael Rosen argued that this distinction shows that “the difference seems to be simply that analytic philosophers are good ones and Continental philosophers aren't,” which serves as an example of how one side of the debate could use a distinction against the other.

I personally believe that a distinction in subject matter, whether concrete or approximate, is unproblematic as long as it isn’t accompanied by a value judgment like that in the example by Rosen. The breadth of philosophical inquiry is part of what adds to the greatness of the field. There is space for variety in approaches and subjects without that necessarily leading to hostility or boundary policing.